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THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
INTRODUCT I ON 
O ne of the principal purposes of the United Nations is "to bring 
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles 
of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of inter-
national disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace." It was with this object in view that the United Nations 
Charter created the International Court of Justice as one of the 
principal organs of the United Nations (Articles 1 and 7). 
The importance of the place occupied by the Court in the 
United Nations is emphasized by other provisions of the Charter: the 
Court is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (Article 
92); again, the Security Council, when called upon to make recom-
mendations in a dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security, should take into 
consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred 
by the parties to the International Court of Justice (Article 36). 
The purpose of the present pamphlet is to give a short account 
of the organization of the Court, its jurisdiction, the manner in which 
it functions and, finally, the judgments and advisory opinions delivered 
by the Court since its creation. This will be preceded by a brief his-
torical outline of the judicial settlement of international disputes. 
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HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT 
OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 
1. The O rig in of Arbitration 
The idea ,of entrusting the settlement of international disputes to an 
impartial authority, which would give a decision on the basis of law, 
is a very old one. Examples are to be found in ancient Greece, but th 
modern development of international arbitration dates from the Jay 
Treaty of 1794, between Great Britain and the United States, which 
provided for the establishment of mixed eommissions for the settle-
ment of a number of disputes existing between the two countries. 
These commissions were composed of an equal number of members 
appointed by each of the parties and presided over by an umpire. 
During the nineteenth century, the movement in favor of arbitration 
gathered momentum. A decisive stage in this development was 
marked by the Alabama arbitration between the United States and 
Great Britain in 1872. In the years that followed, several other inter-
national disputes were settled by arbitration. 
2. The Permanent Court of Arbitration 
A further stage in the development of the judicial settlement of inter-
national disputes was reached with the First Hague Conference of 
1899. The powers which took part in this conference signed the 
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 
in which they undertook to use their best efforts to ensure the pacific 
settlement of international differences with a view to obviating, as far 
as possible, recourse to force in the relations between states. Believ-
ing that the only effective means of extending the rule of law and of 
increasing respect for international justice was the creation of a 
permanent arbitral body open to all states, they set up the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration. Although the latter was a permanent institution, 
it was not a permanent tribunal in the true sense of the word but a 
panel of about 150 to 200 persons (four from each contracting power) 
from among whom states could select one or more arbitrators to form 
a tribunal for the settlement of a particular dispute. 
The Permanent Court of Arbitration, which was maintained by 
the Second Hague Conference of 1907, is still in existence. From 1899 
to the present, it has decided about 20 cases, some of which have been 
of considerable importance. The functioning of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, however, presupposes that two states, although parties 
to a dispute, are nevertheless animated by a sincere desire to arrive at 
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a settlement. They must not only agree beforehand to submit the dis-
pute to arbitration, but must also reach agreement with respect to the 
arbitrators to be appointed and the formulation of the questions to be 
submitted to them. It is obvious that the negotiations leading to such 
an agreement may be both lengthy and difficult. 
The Second Hague Conference had envisaged the establish-
ment of two bodies whose permanent character was much more 
marked than that of the Permanent Court of Arbitration: an inter-
national Prize Court and an Arbib'al Court of Justice. Although, for 
various reasons, these two attempts did not succeed, they are never-
theless of interest since they show that it was in the field of judicial 
institutions that the powers sought to make a first step in the direction 
of international organization. A member of the United States delega-
tion to the Second Hague Conference expressed himself in words 
which history has borne out in a striking manner, when he declared, 
in connection with the Arbitral Court of Justice, that: "A court of 
that kind will deliver its judgments in virtue of the authority of the 
united nations." 
3. The Permanent Court of International Justice and the 
International Court of Justice 
The creation in 1920 of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 
for which provision had been made in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, marked the greatest advance in the field of the judicial set-
tlement of international disputes. The Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice was a court in the real sense of the term and was ready 
to function at any time. It is b'ue that, as in the case of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, its jurisdiction depended solely upon the consent 
of the parties to a dispute. On the other hand, the fact that the Court 
was open to states at any time made it possible for them to accept its 
jurisdiction not only for the purposes of a particular dispute but for 
all disputes which might arise in the future-that is, before any dis-
pute had come into being-and hence at a time when they were not 
divided by disagreement. In other words, there existed, for the first 
time, an international tribunal, having a corporate character, before 
which a state could bring a dispute by means of a unilateral applica-
tion calling upon another state to appear before it, without there being 
any need for the parties to the dispute to reach a prior agreement on 
the composition of the tribunal and the questions to be submitted to it. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice sat for the first 
time in 1922. Its activities were interrupted by the Second World War 
and in 1946 it was dissolved in consequence of the dissolution of the 
League of Nations. Between 1922 and 1939, however, it dealt with 
79 cases, (of which 51 were contentious) which states had referred 
to it either by special agreement or by unilateral application, while 28 
4 
cases arose from requests for advisory opinions submitted by the Coun-
cil of the League of Nations. In some hundreds of treaties provision 
was made enabling states to bring disputes before the Court by uni-
lateral application. Numerous states also recognized the Comt's com-
pulsory jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute. 
In 1945, a new judicial organ, the International Court of Ju -
tice, was brought into being by the Charter of the United Nations. 
The Statute of the Court is annexed to the Charter, of which it forms 
an integral part. Except for a few changes, most of which are purely 
formal, it is similar to the Statute of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice. Furthermore, when the new Court met, it adopted the 
Rules of Court of its predecessor without any substantial change. The 
work of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which began 
in 1922, is today entrusted to the International Court of Justice and 
therefore continues uninterrupted. This is more especially true since 
the great number of treaties, conventions and undertakings which, as 
stated above, provided for the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice are, for the most part, still in force; the Statute 
of the present Court (Article 37) lays down that, whenever a treaty 
or convention provides for reference of a matter to a tribunal to have 
been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, the matter shall be referred to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. 
II 
ORGANIZATION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
1. The Judges of the Court 
The Court consists of 15 judges who are elected by the General 
Assembly and the Security Council. They are chosen from a list of 
persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration; or, in the case of members of the United Nations not 
represented in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, by national groups 
appointed for this purpose by their governments under the same con-
ditions as those prescribed for members of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration. The General Assembly and the Security Council hold 
separate elections independently of one another. They must be satis-
fied not only that the persons to be elected should individually possess 
the qualifications required in their respective countries for appoint-
ment to the highest judicial offices, but also that, in the body as a 
whole, the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems 
of the world should be represented. To be elected, a candidate must 
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obtain a majority of votes, both in the Assembly and in the Council. 
Not more than one candidate of the same nationality may be elected. 
The Statute lays down the procedure to be applied when one or more 
seats still remain unfilled after three meetings have been held for the 
purpose of the election but concurring majorities have not been 
achieved in the two organs. There is also a provision laying down the 
conditions under which a state which is a party to the Statute but is 
not a member of the United Nations may take part in the election of 
judges of the Court. 
Judges of the Court are elected for terms of nine years and are 
eligible for re-election. As a result of special transitory provisions 
made with regard to the elections held in 1946, with a view to ensur-
ing the gradual renewal of the Court, the terms of five of the 15 
judges expire at the end of every three years. 
Every three years the Court elects its President and Vice-
President, who are eligible for re-election. 
The judges are bound to hold themselves permanently at the 
disposal of the Court unless they are on leave or prevented by illness 
or other serious reasons recognized as valid. No judge rna y exercise 
any political or administrative function or engage in any other occupa-
tion of a professional nature. Furthermore, no judge may act as agent, 
counselor advocate in any suit or participate in the decision of any 
case in which he has previously taken part as a representative of one 
of the parties or in any other capacity. 
In order to protect them against any political pressure, it is 
provided that no judge can be dismissed unless, in the unanimous 
opinion of the other judges, he has ceased to fulfill the required condi-
tions. 
When engaged on the business of the Court, the judges enjoy 
diplomatic privileges and immunities. Before taking up their duties, 
they must make a solemn declaration in open court that they will 
exercise their powers impartially and conscientiously. 
2. Judges ad hoc 
In the circumstances set out in section V of this pamphlet, the parties 
to a case before the Court are entitled to choose ad hoc, or national, 
judges. These judges are not permanent judges of the Court and sit 
only in the particular case for which they have been appointed. They 
take part in the decision on terms of complete equality with the other 
judges of the Court. 
3. Assessors and Experts 
The Court may invite assessors to sit with it for the consideration of 
a particular case. Unlike the judges ad hoc, assessors are not entitled 
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to vote, and they are chosen by the Court itself and not by the par-
ties. The Court may also entrust any individual or organization that it 
may select with the task of carrying out an enquiry or giving an ex-
pert opinion. 
4. The Reg istry 
The Registry of the Court consists of a registrar, a deputy-registrar 
and other officials. The Registrar and Deputy-Registrar are elected by 
the Court for a term of seven years and may be re-elected. The other 
officials of the Registry are appointed by the Court on proposals sub-
mitted by the Registrar. The Registrar is responsible for all depart-
ments of the Registry. He prepares and keeps up to date the General 
List of cases submitted to the Court. He is the regular channel for 
communications to and from the Court and, within the limits of the 
discretion attaching to his duties, keeps the press informed of the 
Court's work. He is also responsible for publishing a collection of the 
Court's judgments and advisory opinions and documents of the writ-
ten proceedings and other volumes. Finally, the Registrar is respon-
sible for the archives of the Court and prepares the Court's budget.1 
The Registrar is assisted by a staff of secretaries and other officials 
who carry out a variety of functions: correspondence, legal research, 
drafting and translation, interpretation at meetings of the Court, min-
ute writing, preparation of publications, etc. 
III 
ACCESS TO THE COURT 
Only states may be parties in cases before the Court. In the first place, 
the Court is open to all the members of the United Nations, who are 
ipso facto parties to the Statute of the Court. 
Secondly, the Court is open to certain states which are not 
members of the United Nations but which have become parties to the 
Statute in accordance with Article 93, paragraph 2, of the Charter. 
This Article provides that a state which is not a member may become 
a party to the Statute in conditions to be determined in each case by 
the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Coun-
cil. At the request of Switzerland, the first government to ask to 
1 In 1959, the expenditure of the Court was approximately US $732,000. The 
estimated expenditure for 1960 is US $730,000. 
7 
become a party to the Statute, the General Assembly adopted a reso-
lution defining these conditions as follows: (a) acceptance of the pro-
visions of the Statute; (b) acceptance of the obligations of a member 
of the United Nations under Article 94 of the Charter;2 (c) an under-
taking to contribute to the expenses of the Court such equitable 
amount as may be fixed by the General Assembly. Switzerland became 
a party to the Statute in July 1948. Identical conditions were approved 
by the General Assembly in the case of Liechtenstein, San Marino and 
Japan,3 which subsequently became parties to the Statute. 
Thirdly, the Court is also open to states which are not parties 
to its Statute, on conditions laid down by a Security Council resolu-
tion of October 15, 1946. Such states must file with the Registrar of 
the Court a declaration by which they accept the Court's jurisdiction 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute 
and Rules of the Court, and undertake to comply in good faith with 
the decision or decisions of the Court and to accept all the obligations 
of a member of the United Nations under Article 94 of the Charter. 2 
Such a declaration may be either particular or general. A particular 
declaration is one accepting the Court's jurisdiction in respect of a 
particular dispute or disputes whch have already arisen. A general 
declaration is one accepting the jurisdiction in respect of all disputes, 
or of a particular class or classes of dispute, which have already arisen 
or which may arise in the future. 
The Court is therefore not open to private individuals. It has 
always refused to entertain the petitions and requests which have 
often been addressed to it by individuals who complain that they have 
suffered a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. How-
ever, this does not prevent private interests from being the subject of 
proceedings before the Court, for it is always open to a state to take 
up the complaint of one of its nationals against another state, and to 
seize the Court if it is entitled to do so. But what is then involved is 
a dispute between states. 
2 "1. Each Melnber of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the 
decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a 
party. 
"2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon 
it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have re-
course to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make re-
commendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the 
judgment," 
3Japan became a party to the Statute in 1954, more than two years before 
becoming a member of the United Nations. 
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IV 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
IN CONTENTIOUS CASES 
One of the functions of the Court is, by delivering binding judgments, 
to decide in accordance with international law all disputes which are 
submitted to it by states. But the fact that the Court is open to a 
state does not mean that the state is obliged to have its disputes with 
other states decided by the Court. The Court's jurisdiction to try 
contentious cases depends upon the consent of states, since interna-
tional justice, in contrast to national justice, is still optional. 
The consent of states may be expressed in many ways. First, 
two states which are in disagreement regarding a certain question may 
agree to refer it to the Court. In such cases, the Court is generally 
seized by the notification of a special agreement concluded for that 
purpose by the two states. But a state may also accept the jurisdiction 
of the Court with regard to disputes which have not yet arisen: this 
is an undertaking to appear before the Court if a dispute should arise. 
In such cases, the Court is usually seized by a unilateral application of 
one state against another, the latter being then bound to come before 
the Court. There are a great number of treaties and conventions 
under which states bind themselves beforehand to accept the jurisdic-
tion of the Court: bilateral treaties relating to all disputes that may 
arise between two states or to certain categories of disputes, multi-
lateral conventions relating to one or more categories of disputes, etc. 
In the same connection, states which are parties to the Statute may 
give a very broad undertaking in accordance with Article 36, para-
graph 2: they may at any time declare that they recognize as compul-
sory, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the 
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: (a) the in-
terpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the 
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach 
of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the repara-
tion to be made for the breach of an international obligation. Such 
declarations are sometimes accompanied by conditions, for example: 
reciprocity, limited duration, nature of the dispute. The following is 
a list of the 38 states which accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the 




































Union of South Africa 
United Arab Republic 
United Kingdom of 
Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland 
United States of America 
Uruguay 
WORKING OF .THE COURT 
The seat of the Court is at The Hague, Netherlands. A special agree-
ment concluded between the United Nations and the Carnegie Foun-
dation governs the terms on which the Court occupies premises in the 
Peace Palace. The Court may, however, sit and discharge its duties 
elsewhere should it consider it advisable to do so. The official lan-
guages of the Court are French and English, but the Court may au-
thorize a party to use another language. 
The Court is permanently in session except during judicial 
vacations. It discharges its duties as a full court (a quorum of nine 
judges being sufficient) but, at the request of the parties, it may also 
sit as a chamber. Indeed, the Statute provides that the Court shall 
elect annually five judges to form a Chamber of Summary Procedure 
for the speedy dispatch of business. The Court also has the power to 
constitute one or more chambers, composed of three or more judges, 
for dealing with particular categories of cases-for example, labor 
cases and cases relating to transit and communications-and a chamber 
for dealing with a particular case submitted to the Court. The cham-
bers provided for in the Statute have not hitherto had occasion to 
function. 
A judge continues to sit even if the case before the Court 
directly concerns his own country. The Rules of Court, however, pro-
vide that if the President is a national of one of the parties to a case 
before the Court, he will abstain from exercising his functions as Pres-
ident in respect of that case. 
If the Court includes upon the bench a judge of the national-
ity of one of the parties, any other party may choose a person to sit 
as judge ad hoc in the case. Similarly if the Court includes upon the 
bench no judge of the nationality of the parties, each of the parties 
may choose a judge ad hoc. 
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VI 
THE LAW APPLIED BY THE COURT 
In accordance with Article 38 of the Statute, the Court applies: (a) 
international treaties and conventions; (b) international custom; (c) 
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations and, 
finally (d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qual-
ified publicists as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules 
of law. 
Furthermore, the Court may decide a case ex aequo et bono, 
that is, according to the principles of equity, if the parties agree 
thereto. 
V II 
PROCEDURE IN CONTENTIOUS CASES 
Cases may be brought before the Court either by notification to the 
Registry of a "special agreement" under which the parties agree to 
refer a dispute to the Court, or by an application by one of the par-
ties founded on a clause providing for compulsory jurisdiction. These 
documents have to specify the subject of the dispute and the parties. 
The Registrar forthwith communicates the special agreement or appli-
cation to all concerned and also to the members of the United Nations 
and to any other states entitled to appear before the Court. 
The various stages of the proceedings are laid down in the 
Rules of Court adopted in 1946. The parties are represented by agents 
and may be assisted by counsel and advocates. The proceedings con-
sist of two parts: written and oral. The written part usually consists of 
the presentation by each of the parties of two pleadings which are 
filed within time-limits fixed by order of the Court. The oral part con-
sists of the hearing by the Court, at a public sitting, of the agents, 
counsel, advocates, witnesses and experts. 
The duration of the written proceedings may vary, depending, 
of course, on the importance and complexity of the case: the parties 
sometimes request long time-limits and frequently even extensions of 
the time-limits fixed. The length of the oral proceedings before the 
Court also depends on the parties. The Court then holds delibera-
tions in camera and is able to prepare its judgment, draft it in the 
two official languages of the Court and deliver it, within a few weeks. 
All questions are decided by a majority of judges present; in the event 
of an equality of votes, the President, or the judge who acts in his 
place, has a casting vote. 
As in cases before national courts, the proceedings before the 
Court may give rise to questions that are incidental to these proceed-
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ings. For example, a party may raise a "preliminary objection"; in 
other words, it puts forward certain reasons - for example, lack of 
jurisdiction - for which, in its view, the Court ought to refuse to 
adjudicate on the merits of the dispute. The ruing of an objection 
suspends the proceedings on the merits and gives rise to separate 
proceedings. In that case, the Court must first decide on the validity 
of the objection, unless it decides to join the objection to the merits. 
Another example of a question arising that is incidental to the pro-
ceedings is constituted by intervention. A third state may ask to 
intervene in a case, if it considers that it has an interest of a legal 
nature which may be affected by the decision. It is for the Court to 
decide upon a request of this kind: !f the dispute between the parties 
relates to the application of a treaty which has also been signed by 
other states, the latter are also entitled to take part in the proceedings, 
in which case the construction given by the judgment will be equally 
binding on any intervening state. 
A judgment of the Court must give the reasons on which it is 
based. Judges who are unable to concur in the decision of the Court, 
or in the reasons given in support of it, may attach to the judgment a 
statement of their separate opinions. 
A judgment of the Court is binding on the parties to the case. 
Although states are never compelled to submit a dispute to the Court, 
once they have come before the Court they are bound to comply with 
its decision. In the present state of international organization, there is 
nothing to guarantee the performance of an international obligation, 
including the obligation to carry out a judgment of the Court. Article 
94 of the Charter, however, provides that if a party fails to perform 
the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment of the Court, the 
other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if 
it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures 
to be taken to give effect to the judgment. 
A judgment of the Court is final and without appeal. After the 
Court has given judgment, the only procedure available to a party is 
a request for an interpretation of the judgment (in the event of dispute 
as to its meaning or scope) or an application for its revision if some 
new fact is discovered which, when the judgment was given, was 
unknown to the Court and to the party claiming revision. 
Unless it is otherwise decided, each party bears its own costs. 
V III 
ADVISORY OPINIONS 
Apart from its jurisdiction to deal with contentious cases, the Court 
also has the power to give advisory opinions, that is, its views on any 
legal question, at the request of the General Assembly of the United 
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Nations, the Security Council, or other bodies authorized to do so. In 
certain cases provision has been made by organs authorized to request 
advisory opinions of the Court that such opinions should have binding 
force. 
The following bodies are authorized to request the Court to 
give advisory opinions: 
General Assembly Economic and Social Council 
Security Council Trusteeship Council 
Interim Committee of the General Assembly 
Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal 
Judgments 
International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
International Monetary Fund 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
International Finance Corporation (!Fc) 
W orId Health Organization (WHO) 
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
W orId Meteorological Organization (WMO) 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
The rules governing the exercise of the Court's advisory func-
tions are laid down in the Statute and Rules of Court. It should in 
particular be noted that, with regard to a request for an advisory 
opinion, the Court may draw up a list of states and international 
organizations considered likely to be able to furnish information on 
the question and may give them an opportunity to submit their views 
in writing or orally, or both. Apart from the express rules applicable 
in advisory proceedings, the Court is guided by the rules applicable 
in contentious cases. 
When the Court has gathered all the necessary information, it 
deliberates in camera. The deliberations last an average of one month. 
The advisory opinion of the Court is then delivered in open court. 
IX 
PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE COURT 
The present members of the Court are: President Helge Klaestad 
(Norway); Vice-President Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan); 
Judges Jules Basdevant (France), Green H. Hackworth (1Jmteg 
l3 
States of America), Bohdan Winiarski (Poland), Abdel Hamid 
Badawi (United Arab Republic), Enrique C. Armand-Ugon (Uru-
guay), Feodor Ivanovich Kojevnikov (Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics), Lucio M. Moreno Quintana (Argentina), Roberto Cordova 
(Mexico), V. K. Wellington Koo (China), Jean Spiropoulos (Greece), 
Sir Percy Spender (Australia) and Ricardo J. Alfaro (Panama). One 
seat is vacant through the death of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht (United 
Kingdom). 
By elections held in November 1960, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice 
( United Kingdom) will serve for the unexpired term of Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht. To succeed the five judges whose terms expire Fepruary 
5, 1961 (Helge Klaestad, Sir Zafrulla Khan, Green H. Hackworth, 
Enrique C. Arm and-U gon and Feodor 1. Kojevnikov), the following 
were elected: Philip C. Jessup (United States), Vladimir Koretsky 
(USSR), Gaetano Morelli (Italy), Kotaro Tanaka (Japan) and Jose 
Luis Bustamente y Rivero (Peru.) 
The Registrar of the Court is Jean Garnier-Coignet. 
X 
CASES DEALT W IT H BY THE COURT SINCE 1946 
A. CONTENTIOUS CASES 
The following disputes have been submitted to the Court since 
1946: 
1. 'Corfu Channel Case 
This dispute, which gave rise to three judgments by the Court, arose 
out of the explosions of mines by which some British warships suffered 
damage while passing through the Corfu Channel in 1946, in a part 
of the Albanian waters which had been previously swept. The ships 
were severely damaged and members of the crew were killed. The 
United Kingdom accused Albania of having laid, or allowed a third 
party to lay, the mines after mine-clearance operations had been 
carried out by the Allied naval authorities. Owing to the political situ-
ation at the time, the incident caused grave tension between the two 
states. The case was brought before the United Nations, and, in 
consequence of a recommendation by the Security Council, it was 
referred to the Court. The first of three judgments (March 25, 1948) 
dealt with the question of the Court's jurisdiction, which-,Albania 
had challenged. ' . 
The second and most important judgment (April 9, '1949) 
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related to the merits of the problem. The Court found that Albania 
was responsible under international law for the explosions that had 
taken place in Albanian waters and for the damage and loss of life 
which had ensued. It did not accept the view that Albania had itself 
laid the mines. On the other hand, it held that the mines could not 
have been laid without the knowledge of the Albanian Government. 
In this connection, the Court took into account certain circumstantial 
evidence which established the responsibility of the territorial govern-
ment. Albania, for its part, had submitted a counterclaim against the 
United Kingdom. It accused the latter of having violated Albanian 
sovereignty by sending warships into Albanian territorial waters and 
of carrying out mine-sweeping operations in Albanian waters after the 
explosions. The Court did not accept the first of these complaints. It 
upheld the generally admitted principle that states are entitled, in 
time of peace, to send their warships through international straits 
without first obtaining the leave of the coastal state. The Court found 
that this was a case of innocent passage. On the other hand, the 
mine-clearance operation of November 12 and 13, 1946, having been 
effected against the will of the Albanian Government, the Court found 
that it constituted an inadmissible intervention in the affairs of 
Albania. In spite of the default of the Albanian Government and its 
dilatory attitude, the Court held that the action of the British Navy 
was a violation of Albanian sovereignty. 
In a third and final judgment (December 15, 1949), the Court 
assessed the amount of reparation due by Albania to the United 
Kingdom. This amount had been determined as a result of "an expert 
enquiry and Albania was ordered to pay the United Kingdom a total 
sum of .£ 844,000 for the damage caused to the" ships and as com-
pensation for the deaths of members of the crews and for personal 
injuries suffered by them. 
2. The Fisheries Case 
The judgment delivered by the Court in the' Fisheries Case set a term 
to a controversy which had been pending between the United King-
dom and Norway for a very long period. In 1935, N.orway enacted a 
decree by which it reserved certain fishing grounds situated off the 
northern coast of Norway for the exclusive use of its own fishermen. 
The question at issue was whether this decree, which laid down!' a 
particular method for drawing the baselines from which the width 
of the Norwegian territorial waters had to be calculated, was valid 
in international law. This case, which aroused considerable interest, 
esp"ecially in maritime states, gave rise to prolonged and voluminous 
proceedings. In its judgment of December 18, 1951, the Court found 
that, contrary to the submissions of the United Kingdom, neither the 
method employed for the delimitation by the 1935 decree nor the 
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lines themselves fixed by the said decree were contrary to inter-
national law • 
3. Case concerning the Protection of French Nationals and 
Protected Persons in Egypt 
As a consequence of certain measures adopted by the Egyptian 
Government against the property and persons of various French 
nationals and protected persons in Egypt, France instituted proceed-
ings in which it invoked the Montreux Convention of 1935, concerning 
the abrogation of the capitulations in Egypt. However, the case was 
not proceeded with, as the Egyptian Government desisted from the 
measures in question. By agreement between the parties, the case 
was struck off the Courfs List (Order of March 29, 1950). 
4. The Asylum Case 
The granting of asylum in the Colombian Embassy at Lima on January 
3, 1949, to a Peruvian national, Haya de la Torre, a political leader 
accused of having instigated a military rebellion, was the subject of a 
dispute between Peru and Colombia which the parties agreed to sub~ 
mit to the Court. The Pan-American Havana Convention on Asylum 
(1928) laid down that, subject to certain conditions, asylum could 
be granted in a foreign embassy to a political offender who was a 
national of the territorial state. The question in dispute was whether 
Colombia, as the state granting the asylum, was entitled u·nilaterally 
to "qualify" the offence committed by the refugee in a manner bind-
ing on the territorial state - that is, to decide whether it was a political 
offence or a common crime. Furthermore, the Court was asked to 
decide whether the territorial state was bound to afford the necessary 
guarantees to enable the refugee to leave the country in safety. In its 
judgment of November 20, 1950, the Court answered both these 
questions in ·the negative, but at the same time it specified that Peru 
had not proved that Haya de la Torre was a common criminal. Lastly, 
it found in favor of a counterclaim submitted by Peru that Haya de la 
Torre had been granted asylum in violation of the Havana Convention, 
as it considered that the asylum had been irregularly granted because 
Haya de la Torre had sought refuge in the Embassy some three 
months after the suppression of the military rebellion, which showed 
that the "urgency" prescribed by the Havana Convention as a condi-
tion for the regularity of asylum no longer existed. 
On the very day on which the Court delivered this judgment, 
Colombia filed a request for an interpretation. By this request, 
Colombia sought to obtain from the Court a reply to the question 
whether the judgment implied an obligation binding the Colombian 
authorities to surrender the refugee, Haya de Ia Torre, to the Peruvian 
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authorities. In a judgment delivered on November 27, 1950, the 
Court declared that the questions raised by Colombia were new 
questions, that they had not been presented in the preceding case, 
and that therefore the Court could not decide upon them by way of 
interpretation. The Court further pointed out that a request for inter-
pretation could only be founded on a dispute between the parties 
concerning the meaning of the judgment, which dispute could not 
have arisen because the request for interpretation had been sub-
mitted on the same day as the delivery of the judgment. The Colom-
bian request was therefore dismissed. 
5. Haya de la Torre Case 
This case, a sequel to the earlier proceedings, was instituted by 
Colombia by means of a fresh application. Immediately after the 
judgment of November 20, 1950, Peru had called upon Colombia to 
surrender Haya de la Torre. Colombia refused to do so, maintaining 
that neither the applicable legal provisions nor the Court's judgment 
placed it under an obligation to surrender the refugee to the Peruvian 
authorities. The Court confirmed this view in its judgment of June 13, 
1951. It declared that the question was a new one, and that although 
the Havana Convention expressly prescribed the surrender of common 
criminals to the local authorities, no obligation of the kind existed in 
regard to political offenders. While confirming that asylum had been 
irregularly granted and that on this ground Peru was entitled to de-
mand its termination, the Court declared that Colombia was not 
bound to surrender the refugee; these two conclusions, it stated, were 
not contradictory because there were other ways in which the asylum 
could be terminated besides the surrender of the refugee. 
6. Case concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States 
in Morocco 
By a decree of December 30, 1948, the French authorities in the 
Moroccan Protectorate imposed a system of licence control in respect 
of imports not involving an official allocation of currency, and limited 
these imports to a number of products indispensable to the Moroccan 
economy. The United States maintained that this measure affected its 
rights under treaties with Morocco and contended that, in accordance 
with these treaties and with the General Act of Algeciras of 1906, no 
Moroccan law or regulation could be applied to its nationals in 
Morocco without its previous consent. In its judgment of August 27, 
1952, the Court held that the import controls were contrary to the 
treaty between the United States and Morocco of 1836 and the 
General Act of Algeciras, since they involved discrimination in favor 
of France against the United States. The Court considered the extent 
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of the consular jurisdiction of the United States in Morocco and held 
that the United States was entitled to exercise such jurisdiction in the 
French zone in all disputes, civil or criminal, between United States 
citizens or persons protected by the United States. It was also entitled 
to exercise such jurisdiction to the extent required by the relevant 
provisions of the General Act of Algeciras. The Court rejected the 
contention of the United States that its consular jurisdiction included 
cases in which only the defendant was a citizen or protege of the 
United States. It also rejected the claim by the United States that the 
application to citizens of the United States of laws and regulations in 
the French Zone of Morocco required the assent of the United States 
Government. Such assent was required only in so far as the intervention 
of the consular courts of the United States was necessary for the effec-
tive enforcement of such laws or regulations as against United States 
citizens. The Court rejected a counterclaim by the United States that 
its nationals in Morocco were entitled to immunity from taxation. It 
also dealt with the question of the valuation of imports by the Moroc-
can customs authorities. 
7. Ambatielos Case 
In 1919, Ambatielos, a Greek shipowner, entered into a contract for 
the purchase of ships with the Government of the United Kingdom. 
Ambatielos claimed he had suffered damage through the failure of the 
United Kingdom Government to carry out the terms of the contract 
and as a result of certain judgments given against 'him by the English 
courts in circumstances which were alleged to be contrary to inter-
national law. The Greek Government took up the case of its national 
and claimed that the United Kingdom was under a duty to submit 
the dispute to arbitration in accordance with treaties between the 
United Kingdom and Greece of 1886 and 1926. The United Kingdom 
objected to the Court's jurisdiction. In a judgment of July 1, 1952, the 
Court held that it had jurisdiction to decide whether the United 
Kingdom was under a duty to submit the dispute to arbitration but, 
on the other hand, that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the merits 
of the Ambatielos claim. In a further judgment of May 19, 1953, the 
Court decided that the dispute was one which the United Kingdom 
was under a duty to submit to arbitration in accordance with the 
treaties of 1886 and 1926. 
8. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case 
In 1933, an agreement was concluded between the Government of 
Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In 1951, laws were passed 
in Iran for the nationalization of the oil industry. These laws resulted 
in a dispute between Iran and the Company. The United Kingdom 
took up the case of the latter and instituted proceedings before the 
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Court. Iran disputed the Court's jurisdiction. In its judgment of July 
22, 1952, the Court decided that it had no jurisdiction to deal with 
the dispute. Its jurisdiction depended on the declarations by Iran and 
the United Kingdom accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction 
under the optional clause of the Statute. The Court held that the 
declaration by Iran, which was ratified in 1932, covered only disputes 
based on treaties concluded by Iran after that date, whereas the claim 
of the United Kingdom was directly or indirectly based on treaties 
concluded prior to 1932. The Court also rejected the view that the 
agreement of 1933 was both a concessionary contract between Iran 
and the Company and an international treaty between Iran and the 
United Kingdom, since the United Kingdom was not a party to the 
contract. The position was not altered by the fact that the conces-
sionary contract was negotiated through the good offices of the 
Council of the League of Nations. By an order of July 5, 1951, the 
Court had indicated interim measures of protection, that is, provi-
sional measures for protecting the rights alleged by either party, in 
proceedings already instituted, until a final judgment is given. In its 
judgment the Court declared that the order of July 5, 1951, had 
ceased to be operative and that the provisional measures therefore 
lapsed. 
9. The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case 
The Minquiers and Ecrehos are hvo groups of islets situated between 
the British Channel Island of Jersey and the coast of France. Under 
a special agreement between France and the United Kingdom, the 
Court was asked to determine which of the parties had produced a 
more convincing proof of title to these groups of islets. After the 
conquest of England by William, Duke of Normandy, in 1066, the 
islands formed part of the Union between England and Normandy 
which lasted until 1204, when Philip Augustus of France conquered 
Normandy but failed to occupy the islands. The United Kingdom sub-
mitted that the islands then remained united with England and that 
this situation was placed on a legal basis by subsequent treaties be-
tween the two countries. France contended that the Minquiers and 
Ecrehos were held by France after 1204, and referred to the same 
medieval treaties as those relied on by the United Kingdom. In its 
judgment of November 17, 1953, the Court considered that none of 
these treaties stated specifically which islands were held by the King 
of England or by the King of France. Moreover, what was of decisive 
importance was not indirect presumptions based on matters in the 
Middle Ages, but direct evidence of possession and the actual exercise 
of sovereignty. After considering this evidence, the Court arrived at 
the conclusion that the sovereignty over the Minquiers and Ecrehos 
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10. The Nottebohm Case 
In this case Liechtenstein claimed restitution and compensation from 
the Government of Guatemala on the ground that the latter had acted 
toward Mr. Nottebohm, a citizen of Liechtenstein, in a manner con-
trary to international law. Guatemala objected to the Court's juris-
diction but the Court overruled this objection in a judgment of 
November 18, 1953. In a second judgment of April 6, 1955, the 
Court held that Liechtenstein's claim was inadmissible on grounds 
relating to Mr. Nottebohm's nationality. It was the bond of nationality 
between a state and an individual which alone conferred upon the 
state the right to put forward an international claim on his behalf. 
Mr. Nottebohm, who was then a German national, had settled in 
Guatemala in 1905 and continued to reside there. In October 1939-
after the beginning of the Second World War - while on a visit to 
Europe, he obtained Liechtenstein nationality and returned to Guate-
mala in 1940, where he resumed his former business activities until 
his removal as a result of war measures in 1943. On the international 
plane the grant of nationality was entitled to recognition by other 
states only if it represented a genuine connection between the indi-
vidual and the state granting its nationality. Mr. Nottebohm's nation-
ality, however, was not based on any real prior connection with 
Liechtenstein, since he always retained his family and business con-
nections with Germany and had been settled in Guatemala for 34 
years. Moreover, the object of his naturalization was to enable him 
to acquire the status of a neutral national in time of war. For these 
reasons, Liechtenstein was not entitled to take up his case and put 
forward an international claim on his behalf against Guatemala. 
11. Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 
A certain quantity of monetary gold was removed by the Germans 
from Rome in 1943. It was later recovered in Germany and found to 
belong to Albania. The 1946 agreement on reparation from Germany 
provided that monetary gold found in Germany should be pooled for 
distribution among the countries entitled to receive a share of it. The 
United Kingdom claimed that the gold should be delivered to it in 
partial satisfaction of the Court's judgment of 1946 in the Corfu 
Channel case (see No.1, page 14). Italy claimed that the gold should 
be delivered to it in partial satisfaction for the damage which it 
alleged it had suffered as a result of an Albanian law of January 13, 
1945. In the Washington statement of April 25, 1951, the Govern-
ments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, to 
whom the implementation of the reparations agreement had been en-
trusted, decided that the gold should be delivered to the United 
22 
Kingdom unless, within a certain time limit, Italy or Albania applied 
to the Court requesting it to adjudicate on their respective rights. 
Albania took no action in the matter, but within the prescribed time 
limit Italy made an application to the Court. Later, however, Italy 
raised the preliminary question as to whether the Court had jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate upon the validity of the Italian claim against 
Albania. In its judgment of June 15, 1954, the Court decided that, in 
order to determine whether Italy was entitled to receive the gold, it 
was necessary to determine whether Albania had committed an inter-
national wrong against Italy and whether it was under an obligation 
to pay compensation to Italy. To go into the merits of such questions 
would be to decide a dispute between Italy and Albania which the 
Court had no jurisdiction to do without Albania's consent. For this 
reason the Court could also not decide the question of priority as 
between the claims of Italy and the United Kingdom, for this question 
could arise only if it was decided that, as between Italy and Albania, 
the gold should go to Italy. 
12. Electricite de Beyrouth Company Case 
This case between France and Lebanon arose out of certain measures 
adopted by the Lebanese Government which the Electricite de Bey-
routh Company, a French limited company, regarded as contrary to 
undertakings entered into by that Government. These undertakings, 
which related to concessions of French companies and companies with 
French capital in Lebanon, formed part of an agreement between 
France and Lebanon of 1948. Mter the case had been brought before 
the Court by France on August 11, 1953, the Lebanese Government 
and the Electricite de Beyrouth Company entered into an agreement 
on March 26, 1954, for the settlement of the dispute by a repurchase 
of the concession. This agreement was ratified by the Lebanese Parlia-
ment on June 30, 1954. Moreover, it was agreed between the French 
and Lebanese Governments that as soon as a settlement was reached, 
France would discontinue the proceedings. On July 23, 1954, there-
fore, the French Government informed the Court that it was not 
going on with the proceedings, and on July 29, 1954, the Court 
made an order for the removal of the case from the List. 
13-14. Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of 
United States of America 
On March 3, 1954, the United States of America instituted proceed-
ings against the Hungarian People's Republic and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics "on account of certain actions of the Hungarian 
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Government in concert with the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics" regarding an aircraft and crew of the United 
States which had been forced to land on Hungarian territory. The 
United States relied on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Court's Statute, 
which provides that the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases 
which the parties refer to it, and it stated that it submitted to the 
Court's jurisdiction for the purpose of the two cases and indicated 
that it was open to the other two governments to do likewise. In a 
letter to the Court dated April 30, 1954, the Government of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics attributed responsibility for the incident 
to the United States and said that it regarded as unacceptable the 
proposal of the Government of the United States that the Court 
should examine the case. In a letter to the Court dated June 14, 1954, 
the Hungarian Government stated that it was unable to submit to its 
jurisdiction in the matter. The Court found that in the circumstances 
it did not have jurisdiction to deal with these cases and on July 12, 
1954, it made two orders removing them from the List. 
15. Aerial Incident of March 10, 195-3 
On March 29, 1955, the United States instituted proceedings against 
Czechoslovakia on account of "certain wrongful acts committed by 
MIG-type aircraft from Czechoslovakia within the United States zone 
of occupation in Germany on March la, 1953." In its application to 
the Court, the United States Government stated that it submitted to 
the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of the case and that it was 
open to the Czechoslovak Government to do likewise. The United 
States Government relied on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Court's 
Statute, which provides that the Court's jurisdiction comprises all 
cases which the parties refer to it. In a letter to the Court, Czecho-
slovakia attributed responsibility for the incident to the United States 
and considered that there was no reason for the case to be dealt with 
by the Court. The Court found that Czechoslovakia had not accepted 
its jurisdiction to deal with the dispute and on March 14, 1956, it 
made an order ren10ving the case from the List. 
16-17. Antarctica Cases 
On May 4, 1955, the United Kingdom instituted proceedings before 
the Court against Argentina and Chile concerning disputes as to the 
sovereignty over certain lands and islands in the Antarctic. In its 
applications to the Court, the United Kingdom stated that it sub-
mitted to the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of the case, and 
although, as far as it was aware, Argentina and Chile had not yet 
accepted the Court's jurisdiction, they were legally qualified to do so. 
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Moreover, the United Kingdom relied on Article 36, paragraph 1, of 
the Court's Statute, which provides that the jurisdiction of the Court 
comprises all cases which the parties refer to it. In a letter of July 15, 
1955, the Government of Chile informed the Court that in its view 
the application of the Government of the United Kingdom was un-
founded and that it was not open to the Court to exercise jurisdiction. 
In a note of August 1, 1955, the Government of Argentina informed 
the Court of its refusal to accept its jurisdiction to deal with the case. 
In these circumstances, the Court found that neither Chile nor Argen-
tina had accepted its jurisdiction to deal with the cases and on 
March 16, 1955, it made orders removing them from the List. 
18. Aerial Incident of October 7, 1952 
On June 2, 1955, the United States instituted proceedings against the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on account of Hcertain wilful acts 
committed by fighter aircraft of the Soviet Government against a 
United States Air Force B29 aircraft and its crew off Hokkaido, Japan, 
on October 7, 1952." In its application to the Court, the United 
States Government stated that it submitted to the Court's jurisdiction 
for the purposes of the case and that it was open to the Soviet Govern-
ment to do likewise. The United States relied on Article 36, paragraph 
1, of the Court's Statute, which provides that the jurisdiction of the 
Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it. In a letter to 
the Court, the Soviet Union attributed responsibility for the incident 
to the United States and considered that there was no reason for the 
question to be dealt with by the Court. The Court found that the 
Soviet Union had not accepted its jurisdiction to deal with the dispute 
and on March 14, 1956, it made an order removing the case from the 
List. 
19. Case of Certain Norwegian loans 
Certain Norwegian loans had been floated in France between the 
years 1885 and 1909. The bonds of these loans stated the amount of 
the obligation in gold or in currency convertible into gold, as well as 
in various national currencies. From the time when Norway sus-
pended the convertibility of its currency into gold, the loans had been 
serviced in Norwegian kroner. The French Government, espousing 
the 'cause of the French bondholders, filed an application requesting 
the Court to declare that the debt should be discharged by payment 
of the gold value of the coupons of the bonds on the date of payment 
and of the gold value of the redeemed bonds on the date of repay-
ment. The Norwegian Government raised a number of preliminary 
objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and, in the judgment it 
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delivered on July 6, 1957, the Court found that it was without juris-
diction to adjudicate on the dispute. Indeed, the Court held that, 
since its jurisdiction depended upon the two unilateral declarations 
made by the parties, jurisdiction was conferred upon the Court only 
to the extent to which those declarations coincided in conferring it. 
The Norwegian Government was therefore entitled, by virtue of the 
condition of reciprocity, to invoke in its own favor the reservation 
contained in the French declaration which excluded from the juris-
diction of the Court differences relating to matters which were essen-
tially within the national jurisdiction as understood by the Govern-
ment of the French Republic. 
20. Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory 
This dispute, which gave rise to two judgments by the Court, arose 
out of the following set of facts. The Portuguese possessions in India 
included, at some distance inland from the port of Daman, the two 
enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-Aveli which, in mid-1954, passed 
under an autonomous local administration. Portugal claimed that it 
had a right of passage to those enclaves and between one enclave and 
the other to the extent necessary for the exercise of its sovereignty 
and subject to the regulation and control of India; that that right 
derived from agreements concluded in the eighteenth century be-
tween Portugal and the Marathas, from local customs established be-
tween Portugal and the successive sovereigns of the Indian peninsula, 
from general international custom in regard to enclaves and from the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; that, in July 
1954, contrary to the practice previously followed, the Indian Govern-
ment had prevented Portugal from exercising the right of passage 
claimed by it and that that situation should be redressed. The first judg-
ment - that of November 26, 1957 - related to the jurisdiction of the 
Court, which was challenged by India. The Court rejected four of the 
preliminary objections raised by India and joined the other two to the 
merits. In the second judgment - that of April 12, 1960 - after reject-
ing the two remaining preliminary objections, the Court gave its 
decision on the claims of Portugal, which India maintained to be 
unfounded. Mter examining the situation of Dadra and N agar-A veli 
during the Maratha period and the practice subsequently developed in 
regard to those enclaves, the Court found that Portugal had in 1954 
the right of passage claimed by it but that such right was limited to 
the passage of private persons, civil officials and goods in general and 
did not extend to armed forces, armed police, arms and ammunition. 
The Court found finally that India had not acted contrary to the 
obligations imposed on it by the existence of the right of passage" thus 
found to belong to Portugal. 
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21. Case concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 
Governing the Guardianship of Infants 
The Swedish authorities had placed an infant of Netherlands nation-
ality residing in Sweden under the regime of protective upbringing 
instituted by Swedish law for the protection of children and young 
persons. The father of the child, jointly with the deputy-guardian 
appointed by a Netherlands court, appealed against the action of the 
Swedish authorities, but the measure of protective upbringing was 
maintained. The Netherlands Government claimed that the decisions 
which instituted and maintained the protective upbringing were not 
in conformity with Sweden's obligations under the Hague Convention 
of 1902 governing the guardianship of infants, the provisions of which 
were based on the principle that the national law of the infant is 
applicable. In its judgment of November 28, 1958, the Court held 
that the 1902 Convention on guardianship did not include within its 
scope the matter of the protection of children as understood by the 
Swedish law on the protection of children and young persons and 
that the 1902 Convention could not have given rise to obligations in 
a field outside the matter with which it was concerned. Accordingly 
the Court did not, in this case, find any failure to observe the Con-
vention on the part of Sweden. 
22. Interhandel Case 
In 1942, the Government of the United States of America vested 
almost all of the shares of the General Aniline and Film Corporation 
(GAF), a company 'incorporated in the United States, on the ground 
that those shares, which were owned by Interhandel, a company 
registered in Bale, belonged in reality to the I. G. Farbenindustrie of 
Frankfurt, or that the GAF was in one way or another controlled by 
that company. In an application dated October 1, 1957, the Swiss 
Government asked the Court to declare that the United States Gov-
ernment was under an obligation to restore to Interhandel the assets 
of that company which had been vested or, alternatively, that the 
dispute on the matter between Switzerland and the United States 
was one that was fit for submission for judicial settlement, arbitration 
or conciliation. Two days later, the Swiss Government asked the Court 
to indicate, as an interim measure of protection, that the United 
States should not part with these assets so long as proceedings in this 
dispute were pending and, in particular, should not sell the shares of 
the General Aniline and Film Corporation which were claimed by the 
Swiss Federal Government as the property of its nationals. On Octo-
ber 24, 1957, the Court made an order in which it noted that, in the 
light of the information furnished to the Court, it appeared that the 
sale of the shares in question could only be effected after the termina-
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tion of judicial proceedings pending in the United States, in respect of 
which there was no indication of a speedy conclusion; that it was the 
stated intention of the United States Government not to take action 
at that time to fix a time schedule for the sale of the shares and that 
accordingly there was no need to indicate interim measures of pro-
tection. The United States raised preliminary objections to the juris-
diction of the Court and, in its judgment of March 21, 1959, the 
Court found that the application of the Government of the Swiss 
Confederation was inadmissible in regard both to the principal claim 
and to the alternative claim for the reason that Interhandel had not 
exhausted the local remedies available to it in the United States courts. 
23. Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955 ( Israel v. Bulgaria) 
This case arose out of the destruction by Bulgarian anti-aircraft 
defence forces of an aircraft belonging to an Israel airline. Israel 
instituted proceedings before the Court by means of an application in 
October 1957. Bulgaria having challenged the Court's jurisdiction 
to deal with the claim, Israel contended that, since Bulgaria had in 
1921 accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice for an unlimited period, that acceptance became 
applicable, when Bulgaria was admitted to the United Nations in 
1955, to the jurisdiction of the present Court by virtue of Article 36, 
paragraph 5, of the Statute, which provides that declarations made 
under the Statute of the former Court, which are still in force, shall 
be deemed, as between the parties to the Statute, to be acceptances 
applicable to the new Court for the period which they still have to 
run and in accordance with their terms. In its judgment on the pre-
liminary objections, delivered on May 26, 1959, the Court found that it 
was without jurisdiction on the ground that Article 36, paragraph 5, 
was intended to preserve only declarations in force as between states 
signatories of the Charter, and not subsequently to revive undertakings 
which had lapsed on the dissolution of the Permanent Court. 
24. Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955 
( United States of America v. Bulgaria) 
This case arose out of the incident which was the subject of the pro-
ceedings mentioned under No. 23. The aircraft destroyed by Bulgarian 
anti-aircraft defence forces on July 27, 1955, was carrying several 
United States nationals who, like the other passengers and the mem-
bers of the crew, were killed. In its application instituting proceedings, 
the United States Government asked the Court to find that the 
Bulgarian Goverment was liable for the damage caused through the 
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deaths of the United States nationals and the destruction of their 
property on board the aircraft and to a ward damages and costs .. 
Bulgaria filed preliminary objections to the Court's jurisdiction and 
the proceedings on the merits were therefore suspended. Before the 
date fixed for the hearings of the Bulgarian objections the United 
States Government informed the Court that, as a result of further 
considerations of questions of jurisdiction raised by the statement of 
Bulgaria's preliminary objections and the United States observations 
thereon, it had decided to request the discontinuance of the pro-
ceedings. The Bulgarian Government did not oppose such discon-
tinuance and, in an order made on May 30, 1960, the Court directed 
that the case should be removed from the List. 
25. Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955 ( United Kingdom v. Bulgaria) 
This case arose out of the same incident as that mentioned under 
Nos. 23 and 24. The aircraft destroyed by Bulgarian anti-aircraft 
defence forces on July 27, 1955, was carrying several nationals of 
the United Kingdom and Colonies who, like the other passengers 
and the members of the crew, were killed. The United Kingdom Gov-
ernment asked the Court to declare that Bulgaria was responsible 
for the losses sustained by citizens of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies by reason of the deaths of persons on board, as well as for 
the loss of personal effects and freight owned by citizens of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies carried on the aircraft and to award 
damages and costs against Bulgaria. The United Kingdom filed its 
Memorial within the time limit fixed but, before the date fixed for 
the filing of the Bulgarian Counter-Memorial, the United Kingdom 
Government informed the Court of its decision to discontinue the 
proceedings, having regard to the decision of the Court of May 26, 
1959, that it had no jurisdiction in respect of the case concerning 
this incident brought by Israel against Bulgaria. Bulgaria did not 
oppose the discontinuance of the proceedings and, on August 3, 1959, 
the Court made an order removing the case from the List. 
26. Case concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land 
By a special agreement signed in March 1957 between the Nether-
lands and Belgium, the Court was asked to settle a dispute as to the 
sovereignty over two plots of land situated in an area north of the 
Belgian town of Turnhout where the frontier between the two coun-
tries presents certain unusual features, there being a number of 
enclaves formed by the Belgian commune of Baerle-Duc and the 
Netherlands commune of Baarle-Nassau. The Court was informed 
that this situation was of very ancient origin. From the documents 
produced by the parties it appeared that a Communal Minute drawn 
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up by the authorities of these two communes between 1836 and 1841 
(on which the Netherlands relied) attributed the two plots in question 
to Baarle-Nassau, whereas the Descriptive Minute of the frontier 
annexed to the Boundary Convention of 1843 which was concluded 
after the separation of Belgium from the Netherlands (and on which 
Belgium relied) attributed them to Baerle-Duc, as did also the special 
map annexed to the Boundary Convention. The Netherlands Govern-
ment maintained that the Boundary Convention recognized the exis-
tence of the status quo as determined by the Communal Minute, 
under which sovereignty over the disputed plots was recognized as 
vested in the Netherlands, and that the provision by which the two 
plots were attributed to Belgium was vitiated by a mistake as was 
evident from a mere comparison of the terms of the Communal 
Minute with those of the Descriptive Minute. The Netherlands 
claimed further that its sovereignty over the disputed plots had been 
established by the exercise of various acts of sovereignty since 1843. 
Mter considering all the evidence produced, the Court concluded 
that the Boundary Convention did determine to which state the 
various plots in each commune belonged and that no case of mistake 
had been made out and, finally, that the acts relied upon by the 
Netherlands as establishing its sovereignty were largely of a routine 
and administrative character and were insufficient to displace Belgian 
sovereignty established by the Boundary Convention. In its judgment 
delivered on June 20, 1959, the Court accordingly found that sov-
ereignty over the two disputed plots belonged to Belgium. 
27. Case concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain 
on December 23, 1906 
On October 7, 1894, Honduras and Nicaragua signed a convention 
for the demarcation of the limits between the two countries, one of 
the articles of which provided that, in certain circumstances, any 
points of the boundary line which were left unsettled should be 
submitted to the decision of the Government of Spain. In October 
1904 the King of Spain was asked to determine that part of the 
frontier line on which the Mixed Boundary Commission appointed 
by the two countries had been unable to reach agreement. The King 
gave his arbitral award on December 23, 1906. Nicaragua contested 
the validity of the award and, in accordance with a resolution of the 
Organization of American States, the two countries agreed in July 
1957 on the procedure to be followed for submitting the dispute on 
this matter to the International Court of Justice. In the application 
by which the case was brought before the Court on July 1, 1958, 
the Government of Honduras claimed that failure by the Government 
of Nicaragua to give effect to the arbitral award constituted a breach 
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of an international obligation and asked the Court to declare that 
Nicaragua was under an obligation to give eHect to the. award. The 
Court was expected to render its judgment in November 1960. 
28. Aerial Incident of September 4, 1954 
On August 22, 1958, the United States of America instituted pro-
ceedings against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on account 
of "certain willful acts committed by military aircraft of the Soviet 
Government on September 4, 1954, in the international air space 
over the Sea of Japan against a United States Navy P2-V-type air-
craft, commonly known as a Neptune type, and against its crew." 
In its application to the Court, the United States Government stated 
that it submitted to the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of the 
case and that the Soviet Government was qualified to do likewise. 
The United States relied on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Court's 
Statute, which provides that the jurisdiction of the Court comprises 
all cases which the parties refer to it. In a letter to the Court, the 
Soviet Union attributed responsibility for the incident to the United 
States and said it considered that in this case there were no questions 
which needed to be considered by the Court and that it saw no basis 
for turning this question over for examination by the Court. In the 
circumstances, the Court found that it had not before it any accept-
ance by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the dispute and that 
therefore it could take no further steps upon the application. The 
Court accordingly made an order on December 9, 1958, removing 
the case from the List. 
29. Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and 
Power Company, Limited 
On September 23, 1958, the Belgian Government filed an application 
instituting proceedings against Spain in connection with the adjudi-
cation in bankruptcy in Spain in 1948 of the Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Company, Limited, a joint-stock company formed 
in Toronto in 1911. The application stated that the share capital of 
this company had, for more than 25 years, belonged largely to Belgian 
nationals. The Belgian Government claimed that the measures, acts, 
decisions and omissions of the organs of the Spanish state by virtue 
of which the company was declared bankrupt and its property liqui-
dated were contrary to international law and that the Spanish state 
was responsible for the damage that resulted therefrom and was 
consequently under an obligation to restore the property, rights and 
interests of the company as they existed prior to its adjudication in 
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bankruptcy or, if suoh restitution is wholly or partly impossible, to 
pay to the Belgian state equivalent compensation. As an alternative, 
the Court was asked to declare that compensation must be paid up 
to the amount of the share of the capital owned by Belgian nationals 
together with the amount of the sums standing due to them at the 
date of the adjudication in bankruptcy. In May 1960 the Spanish 
Government filed preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the 
Court and the proceedings on the merits were suspended. The Court 
has not yet rendered judgment on the objections raised by Spain. 
30. Case concerning the Compagnie du Port, des Quais et des 
Entrepots de Beyrouth and the Societe Radio-Orient 
This case between France and Lebanon arose out of certain measures 
adopted by the Lebanese Government with regard to two French 
limited companies, the Compagnie du Port, des Quais et des Entre-
pots de Beyrouth and the Societe Radio-Orient. The French Govern-
ment considered these measures to be contrary to certain undertakings 
embodied in an agreement concluded between France and Lebanon 
in 1948 relating to concessions of French companies and companies 
with French capital in Lebanon. France instituted proceedings against 
Lebanon by means of an application on February 13, 1959. Lebanon 
raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court but, 
before a date had been fixed for the hearings on the preliminary ob-
jections, the Court was informed by the parties that satisfactory 
arrangements had been concluded, the situation of the Compagnie 
du Port, des Quais et des Entrepots de Beyrouth having been settled 
for the future by a convention of April 13, 1960, between the state 
of Lebanon and the company, together with an exchange of letters 
between the President of the Council of Ministers of Lebanon and 
the Ambassador of the French Republic at Beirut, and the Societe 
Radio-Orient having been fully satisfied by a decision of the Council 
of Ministers of Lebanon dated May 11, 1960. The President of the 
Court accordingly made an order on August 31, 1960, removing the 
case from the List. 
31. Aerial Incident of November 7, 1954 
On July 7, 1959, the United States of America instituted proceedings 
against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on account of the 
destruction on November 7, 1954, of a United States Air Force B-29 
aircraft in the Japanese territorial air space over Hokkaido, Japan. 
In its application to the Court, the United States Government stated 
that it submitted to the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of the 
case and that the Soviet Government was qualified to do likewise. 
The United States relied on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Court's 
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Statute, which provides that the jurisdiction of the Court comprifies 
all cases which the parties refer to it. In a letter to the Court, the 
Soviet Union attributed responsibility for the incident to the United 
States and said it considered that in this case there were no questions 
which needed to be solved by the Court and that it did not see any 
basis for the filing of this case with the Court. In these circumstances, 
the Court found that it had not before it any acceptance by the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the juris-
diction of the Court to deal with the dispute and that therefore it 
could take no further steps upon the application. The Court accord-
ingly made an order on October 7, 1959, removing the case from the 
List. 
32. Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear 
In an application instituting proceedings against Thailand filed on 
October 6, 1959, Cambodia complained that since 1949 Thailand had 
persisted in the occupation of a portion of Cambodian territory where 
there are the ruins of a holy monastery, the Temple of Preah Vihear, 
a sacred place of pilgrimage and worship for the people of Cambodia. 
Cambodia asked the Court to declare that territorial sovereignty 
over the Temple belonged to the Kingdom of Cambodia and that 
Thailand was under an obligation to withdraw the detachments of 
armed forces it had stationed since 1954 in the ruins of the Temple. 
On May 23, 1960, the Government of Thailand filed preliminary 
objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and the proceedings on the 
merits were suspended. The Court has not yet rendered judgment 
on the objections raised by Thailand. 
B. ADVISORY OPINIONS 
ince 1946, th Court has given the follo\ving advisory 
opinions: 
1. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the 
United Nations ( Article 4 of the Charter) 
Since the creation of the United Nations some 12 states had unsuc-
cessfully applied for admission. Their applications were rejected by 
the Security Council in consequence of a veto imposed by one or 
other of the states which are permanent members of the Council. 
A proposal was then made for the admission of all the candidates at 
the same time. The General Assembly referred the question to the 
Court. In the interpretation it gave of Article 4 of the Charter, in 
its advisory opinion of May 28, 1948, the Court declared that the 
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conditions laid down for the admission of states were exhaustive and 
that if these conditions were fulfilled by a state which was a candi-
date, the Security Council ought to make the recommendation which 
would enable the General Assembly to decide upon the admission. 
2. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a 
State to the United Nations 
The preceding opinion given by the Court did not lead to a settle-
ment of the problem in the Security Council. A member of the United 
Nations then proposed that the word "recommendation" in Article 4 
of the Charter should be construed as not necessarily signifying a 
favorable recommendation. In other words, a state might be admitted 
by the General Assembly even in the absence of a recommendation, 
this being interpreted as an unfavorable recommendation. This would, 
it was suggested, make it possible to escape the effects of the veto. 
In the advisory opinion which the Court delivered on this subject on 
March 3, 1950, it pointed out that the Charter laid down two condi-
tions for the admission of new members: a "recommendation" by 
the Security Council and a "decision" by the General Assembly. If 
the latter body had power to decide without a recommendation by 
the Security Council, the Council would be deprived of an important 
function assigned to it by the Charter. The absence of a recommenda-
tion by the Security Council, as the result of a veto, could not be 
interpreted as an "unfavorable" recommendation, since the Council 
itself had interpreted its own decision as meaning that no recommen-
dation had been made. 
3. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations 
As a consequence of the assassination in Palestine of Count Berna-
dotte, the United Nations Palestine Mediator, and other members of 
the United Nations Mission to Palestine, the General Assembly asked 
the Court whether the United Nations had the capacity to bring an 
international claim against the state responsible with a view to ob-
taining reparation for damage caused to the Organization and to the 
victim. If this question were answered in the affirmative, it was further 
asked in what manner the action taken by the United Nations could 
be reconciled with such rights as might be possessed by the state of 
which the victim was a national. In its opinion of April 11, 1949, 
the Court held that the Organization was intended to exercise func-
tions and rights which could only be explained on the basis of the 
possession of a large measure of international personality and the 
capacity to operate upon the international plane. It followed that the 
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Organization had the capacity to bring a claim and to give it the 
character of an international action for reparation for the damage that 
had been caused to it. The Court further declared that the Organi-
zation can claim reparation not only in respect of damage caused to 
itself, but also in respect of damage suffered by the victim or persons 
entitled through him. Although, according to the traditional rule, 
diplomatic protection had to be exercised by the national state, the 
Organization should be regarded in international law as possessing 
the powers which, even if they are not expressly essential in the 
Charter, are conferred upon the Organization as being essential to 
the discharge of its functions. The Organization may require to 
entrust its agents with important missions in disturbed parts of the 
world. In such cases, it is necessary that the agents should receive 
suitable support and protection. The Court therefore found that the 
Organization has the capacity to claim appropriate reparation, includ-
ing also reparation for damage suffered by the victim or by persons 
entitled through him. The risk of possible competition between the 
Organization and the victim's national state could be eliminated 
either by means of a general convention or by a particular agreement 
in any individual case. 
4-5. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Romania 
This case concerned the procedure to be adopted in regard to the 
settlement of disputes between the states signatories of the peace 
treaties of 1947 (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, on the one hand, and 
the Allied states, on the other). In the first opinion (March 30, 1950), 
the Court stated that the countries which had signed a treaty pro-
viding an arbitral procedure for the settlement of disputes relating 
to the interpretation or application of the treaty were under an 
obligation to appoint their representatives to the arbitration com-
missions prescribed by the treaty. 
Notwithstanding the opinion given on March 30, 1950, the 
three states, which had declined to appoint their representatives on 
the arbitration commissions, failed to modify their attitude. A time 
limit was given to them within which to comply with the obligation 
laid down in the treaties as they had been interpreted by the Court. 
After the expiry of the time limit, the Court was requested to say 
whether the Secretary-General, who, by the terms of the treaties, 
was authorized to appoint the third member of the arbitration com-
mission in the absence of agreement between the parties in respect 
of this appointment, could proceed to make this appointment, even 
if one of the parties had failed to appoint its representative. In a 
further advisory opinion of July 18, 1950, the Court replied that 
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this method couId not be adopted since it would result in creating a 
commission of two members, whereas the Treaty provided for a com-
mission of three members, reaching its decisions by a majority. 
6. International Status of South West Africa 
This advisory opinion, given on July 11, 1950, at the request of the 
General Assembly, was concerned with the determination of the legal 
status of the territory, the administration of which had been placed by 
the League of Nations after the First World War under the mandate 
of the Union of South Africa. The League had disappeared, and with 
it the machinery for the supervision of the mandates. Moreover, the 
Charter of the United Nations did not provide that the former man-
dated territories should automatically come under trusteeship. The 
Court held that the dissolution of the League of Nations and its 
supervisory machinery had not entailed the lapse of the mandate, 
and that the mandatory power was still under an obligation to give 
an account of its administration to the United Nations, which was 
legally qualified to discharge the supervisory functions formerly ex-
ercised by the League of Nations. The degree of supervision to be 
exercised by the General Assembly should not, however, exceed that 
which applied under the mandates system and should conform as 
far as possible to the procedure followed in this respect by the Council 
of the League of Nations. On the other hand, the mandatory power 
was not under an obligation to place the territory under trusteeship, 
although jt might have certain political and moral duties in this 
connection. Finally, it had no competence to modify the international 
status of South West Africa unilaterally. 
7. Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and Petitions 
concerning the Territory of South West Africa 
In the preceding advisory opinion, the Court considered that South 
West Africa had the status of a territory under international mandate 
and that the supervisory functions of the League of Nations were to 
be exercised by the United Nations. The degree of sUQh supervision 
was not to exceed that which applied under the mandates system. 
On October 11, 1954, the General Assembly adopted a special Rule F 
on voting procedure to be followed by the General Assembly in 
taking decisions on questions relating to reports and petitions con-
cerning the territory of South West Mrica. According to this rule, 
such decisions were to be regarded as important questions within 
the meaning of Article 18, paragraph 2, of the United Nations 
Charter and would therefore require a two-thirds majority of members 
of the United Nations present and voting. In its advisory opinion of 
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June 7, 1955, the Court considered that Rule F was a correct appli-
cation of its earlier advisory opinion. It related only to procedure, 
and procedural matters were not material to the degree of supervision 
exercised by the General Assembly. Rule F could not therefore be 
considered as instituting a greater degree of supervision than applied 
under the mandates system. Moreover, the General Assembly was 
entitled to apply its own voting procedure and Rule F was in accord 
with the requirement that the supervision exercised by the General 
Assembly should conform as far as possible to the procedure followed 
by the Council of the League of Nations. 
8. Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on 
South West Africa 
In this advisory opinion, of June 1, 1956, the Court considered that 
it would be in accordance with its advisory opinion of 1950 on the 
international status of South West Africa (see No. 6 above) for the 
Committee on South West Africa, established by the General Assem-
bly, to grant oral hearings to petitioners on matters relating to the 
Territory of South West Africa if such a course was necessary for 
the maintenance of effective international supervision of the mandated 
territory. The General Assembly, which now carried out the super-
visory functions formerly exercised by the Council of the League of 
Nations, was legally qualified to carry out an effective and adequate 
supervision of the administration of the mandated territory. Under 
the League of Nations, the relevant legal provisions made no refer-
ence to hearings and no hearings were ever in fact granted. The 
League Council would, however, have been competent to authorize 
such hearings. Although the degree of supervision to be exercised 
by the General Assembly should not exceed that which applied under 
the mandates system, the grant of hearings would not involve such 
an excess in the degree of supervision. Under the existing circum-
stances, the hearing of petitioners by the Committee on South West 
Africa might be in the interest of the proper working of the mandates 
system. 
9. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide 
In November 1950, the General Assembly asked the Court a series 
of questions as to the position of a state which attached reservations 
to its signature of the multilateral Convention on Genocide if other 
states, signatories of the same convention, objected to these 
reserva tions. 
The Court considered, in its opinion of May 18, 1951, that, 
37 
even if a convention contained no article on the subject of reserva-
tions, it did not follow that they were prohibited. The character of 
the convention, its purpose and its provisions must be taken into 
account. It was the compatibility of the reservation with the purpose 
of the convention which must furnish the criterion of the attitude 
of the state making the reservation, and of the state which objected 
thereto. The Court did not consider that it was possible to give an 
absolute answer to the abstract question put to it. 
As regards the effects of the reservation in relations between 
states, the Court considered that a state could not be bound by a 
reservation to which it had not consented. Every state was therefore 
free to decide for itself whether the state which formula ted the 
reservation was or was not a party to the convention. The situation 
presented real disadvantages, but they could only be remedied by 
the insertion in the convention of an article on the use of reservations. 
A third question referred to the effects of an objection by a 
state which was not yet a party to the convention, either because it 
had not signed it or because it had signed but not ratified it. The 
Court was of the opinion that, as regards the first case, it would be 
inconceivable that a state which had not signed the convention 
should be able to exclude another state from it. In the second case, 
the situation was different; the objection was valid, but it would not 
produce an immediate legal effect; it would merely express and pro-
claim the attitude which a signatory state would assume when it had 
become a party to the convention. In all the foregoing the Court 
adjudicated only on the specific case referred to it, namely, the 
Genocide Convention. 
10. Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal 
The United Nations Administrative Tribunal was established by the 
General Assembly to hear applications alleging non-observance of 
contracts of employment of staff members of the Secretariat of the 
United Nations or of the terms of appointment of such staff members. 
In its advisory opinion of July 13, 1954, the Court considered that 
the General Assembly of the United Nations was not entitled on any 
grounds to refuse to give effect to an award of compensation made 
by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal in favor of a staff 
member of the United Nations whose contract of service had been 
terminated without his assent. The Tribunal was an independent 
and truly judicial body pronouncing final judgments without appeal 
within the limited field of its functions and not merely an advisory or 
subordinate organ. Its judgments were therefore binding on the 
United Nations Organization and thus also on the General Assembly. 
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11. Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International 
Labor Organization upon Complaints Made against the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
The Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of ILO (the jurisdiction 
of which had been accepted by UNESCO for the purpose of settling 
certain disputes which might arise between the organization and its 
staff members) provided that the Tribunal's judgments should be 
final and without appeal, subject to the right of the organization to 
challenge them on the ground, inter alia, that a decision of the 
Tribunal conBrming its jurisdiction was wTong. It further provided 
that in the event of such a challenge, the question of the valadity of 
the decision should be refeTred to the Court for an advisory opinion, 
vvhich would be binding. 
UNESCO alleged that foul' judgments given by the Tribunal in 
favoT of staff members were invalid on the ground that the Tribunal 
had wrongly decided the question of its own jurisdiction. The organi-
zation contended that the staff members, who had held fixed-teTm 
appointments and who had complained of the Director-General's 
refusal to renew their contracts on expiry, had no legal right to such 
renewal, and that consequently the Tribunal had no jurisdiction, 
since it was competent only to hear complaints alleging non-observ-
ance of the terms of appointment of officials and of provisions of the 
Staff Regulations. It accordingly requested an advisory opinion of 
the Court. 
The Court was of the opinion that an administrative mem-
orandum, which had announced that all holders of fixed-term contracts 
would, subject to certain conditions, be offered renewals, might 
reasonably be regarded as binding on the organization and that it 
was sufficient, to establish the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, that the 
complaints should appear to have a substantial and not merely 
artificial connection with the terms and provisions invoked. The 
Court was not concerned with the decisions of the Tribunal on the 
merits. On the issue of jurisdiction, it expressed the opinion that the 
Administrative Tribunal had been competent to hear the complaints 
in question. 
12. Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the 
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
The Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization com-
prises, among other organs, an Assembly and a Maritime Safety Com-
mittee. Under the terms of article 28(a) of the convention for the 
establishment of the organization, this Committee consists of fourteen 
members elected by the Assembly from the members of the organi-
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zation having an important interest in maritime safety, "of which not 
less than eight shall be the largest ship-owning nations." When, on 
January 15, 1959, the Assembly, for the first time, proceeded to elect 
the members of the Committee, it elected neither Liberia nor Panama: 
although those two states were among the eight members of the 
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization which pos-
sessed the largest registered tonnage. Subsequently, the Assembly 
decided to ask the Court whether the Maritime Safety Committee was 
constituted in accordance with the convention for the establishment 
of the organization. In its advisory opinion of June 8, 1960, the Court 
replied to this question in the negative. 
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